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There has been growing concern about the role social media plays
in political polarization. We investigated whether out-group ani-
mosity was particularly successful at generating engagement on
two of the largest social media platforms: Facebook and Twitter.
Analyzing posts from news media accounts and US congressional
members (n = 2,730,215), we found that posts about the political
out-group were shared or retweeted about twice as often as posts
about the in-group. Each individual term referring to the political
out-group increased the odds of a social media post being shared
by 67%. Out-group language consistently emerged as the stron-
gest predictor of shares and retweets: the average effect size of
out-group language was about 4.8 times as strong as that of neg-
ative affect language and about 6.7 times as strong as that of
moral-emotional language—both established predictors of social
media engagement. Language about the out-group was a very
strong predictor of “angry” reactions (the most popular reactions
across all datasets), and language about the in-group was a strong
predictor of “love” reactions, reflecting in-group favoritism and
out-group derogation. This out-group effect was not moderated
by political orientation or social media platform, but stronger ef-
fects were found among political leaders than among news media
accounts. In sum, out-group language is the strongest predictor of
social media engagement across all relevant predictors measured,
suggesting that social media may be creating perverse incentives
for content expressing out-group animosity.
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According to a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, aFacebook research team warned the company in 2018 that
their “algorithms exploit the human brain’s attraction to divi-
siveness.” This research was allegedly shut down by Facebook
executives, and Facebook declined to implement changes pro-
posed by the research team to make the platform less divisive
(1). This article is consistent with concerns that social media
might be incentivizing the spread of polarizing content. For in-
stance, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey has expressed concern about
the popularity of “dunking” (i.e., mocking or denigrating one’s
enemies) on the platform (2). These concerns have become
particularly relevant as social media rhetoric appears to have
incited real-world violence, such as the recent storming of the US
Capital (3). We sought to investigate whether out-group ani-
mosity was associated with increased virality on two of the largest
social media platforms: Facebook and Twitter.
A growing body research has examined the potential role of
social media in exacerbating political polarization (4, 5). A large
portion of this work has centered on the position that social media
sorts us into “echo chambers” or “filter bubbles” that selectively
expose people to content that aligns with their preexisting beliefs
(6–11). However, some recent scholarship questions whether the
“echo chamber” narrative has been exaggerated (12, 13). Some
experiments suggest that social media can indeed increase polari-
zation. For example, temporarily deactivating Facebook can reduce
polarization on policy issues (14). However, other work suggests
that polarization has grown the most among older demographic
groups, who are the least likely to use social media (15), albeit the
most likely to vote. As such, there is an open debate about the role
of social media in political polarization and intergroup conflict.
Other research has examined the features of social media
posts that predict “virality” online. Much of the literature focuses
on the role of emotion in social media sharing. High-arousal
emotions, whether they are positive (e.g., awe) or negative (e.g.,
anger or outrage), contribute to the sharing of content online
(16–20). Tweets expressing moral and emotional content are more
likely to be retweeted within online political conversations, espe-
cially by members of one’s political in-group (21, 22). On Face-
book, posts by politicians that express “indignant disagreement”
receive more likes and shares (23), and negative news tends to
spread farther on Twitter (24). Moreover, false rumors spread
farther and faster on Twitter than true ones, especially in the
domain of politics, possibly because they are more likely to express
emotions such as surprise and fear (25).
Yet, to our knowledge, little research has investigated how social
identity motives contribute to online virality. Group identities are
hypersalient on social media, especially in the context of online
political or moral discussions (26). For example, an analysis of
Twitter accounts found that people are increasingly categorizing
themselves by their political identities in their Twitter bios over
time, providing a public signal of their social identity (27). Addi-
tionally, since sharing behavior is public, it can reflect self-
conscious identity presentation (28, 29). According to social iden-
tity theory (30) and self-categorization theory (31), when group
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identities are highly salient, this can lead individuals to align
themselves more with their fellow in-group members, facilitating
in-group favoritism and out-group derogation in order to maintain
a positive sense of group distinctiveness (32). Thus, messages that
fulfill group-based identity motives may receive more engagement
online. As an anecdotal example, executives at the website Buzz-
feed, which specializes in creating viral content, reportedly noticed
that identity-related content contributed to virality and began
creating articles appealing to specific group identities (33).
People may process information in a manner that is consistent
with their partisan identities, prior beliefs, and motivations, a
process known as motivated cognition (34–37). Scholars noted
early on that the degree to which individuals identify with their
political party “raises a perceptual screen through which the
individual tends to see what is favorable to his [or her] partisan
orientation” (38). Partisan motivations have been hypothesized
to influence online behavior, such as the sharing of true and false
news online (39, 40). Accordingly, we suggest that just as people
engage in motivated cognition—processing information in a way
that supports their beliefs—people may also engage in motivated
tweeting (or sharing, liking, or retweeting), selectively interacting
with and attending to content that aligns with their partisan
identity motivations. There is already evidence suggesting that
people selectively follow (41) and retweet (10, 42) in-group
members at much higher rates than out-group members.
In polarized political contexts, out-group animosity may be a
more successful strategy for expressing one’s partisan identity
and generating engaging content than in-group favoritism. Po-
litical polarization has been growing rapidly in the United States
over the past few decades. Affective polarization, which reflects
dislike of people in the opposing political party as compared to
one’s own party, has most strikingly increased (43), and ideological
polarization may have increased as well (though this is still a topic
of debate) (44). This growth in affective polarization is driven
primarily by increasing out-party animosity (rather than increasing
in-party warmth)—a phenomenon known as “negative partisan-
ship” (45). According to recently released American National
Election Studies data, affective polarization grew particularly
steeply from 2016 to 2020, reaching its highest point in 40 y. Out-
party animosity, more so than in-party warmth, has also become a
more powerful predictor of important behaviors, such as voting
behavior (46) and the sharing of political fake news (39). When
out-party animosity is strong, partisans are motivated to distin-
guish themselves from the out-party (by, for instance, holding
opinions that are distinct from the out-party) (47). While some
research suggests that out-group cues might be more powerful
than in-group cues (48), there is still debate about the extent to
which partisan belief and behavior is driven by in-group favoritism
versus out-group derogation (49). A limitation of prior research is
that much of it is based on self-report surveys, and so it remains
unknown how expressions of in-group favoritism or out-group
animosity play out in a social media context—or whether one
might be a more powerful contributor to virality than the other.
We investigated the role that political in-group and out-group
language, as well as emotional language, play in predicting online
engagement in a large sample of posts from news media accounts
and US congressional members (n = 2,730,215). We sought to
examine this on both Facebook and Twitter since they are two of
the world’s largest and most influential social media companies
and constitute around three billion users out of nearly four bil-
lion total social media users worldwide (50). Specifically, we
were interested in 1) how political in-group and out-group lan-
guage compared to other established predictors of social media
engagement, 2) whether in-group or out-group language was a
better predictor of shares and retweets, and 3) whether out-group
terms were associated with negative emotions (as measured by the
six Facebook “reactions”), and whether in-group terms were as-
sociated with positive emotions, reflecting patterns of out-party
derogation and in-group favoritism. Finally, 4) we wanted to see
if these findings applied to both news sources and political leaders,
who often have an outsized influence on social discourse as well as
policy change.
Results
To analyze these questions, we examined large datasets of tweets
and Facebook posts from liberal media sources and conservative
media sources (as defined by https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/
media-bias-ratings, see Materials and Methods and SI Appendix,
Fig. S3) as well as liberal (i.e., Democrat) and conservative
(i.e., Republican) members of Congress. Specifically, we counted
how many words in each tweet or Facebook post referred to 1)
liberal, 2) conservative, or included 3) negative emotion, 4) posi-
tive emotion, or 5) moral-emotional language. To measure ref-
erence to a liberal or conservative, we use a list of the top 100
most famous Democrat and Republican politicians as defined by
YouGov, a list of all the Democrat and Republican congressional
members and a list of liberal and conservative identity terms (e.g.,
“left-wing,” “conservative,” or “far-right”), which have been used
in prior research (27, 39). We also used previously validated dic-
tionaries of negative affect, positive affect, and moral-emotional
language (21, 51). Adapting prior methods used in similar studies
(22), we fit regression models to examine how language about the
out-group, language about the in-group, as well as language
expressing various emotions (positive affect, negative affect, and
moral-emotional language) predicted retweets and Facebook
shares, controlling for various factors known to be correlated with
retweet or sharing rate, such as whether a tweet is a retweet (for
the Twitter datasets only), whether a message contained a URL or
media, and how many followers or likes the account had. More
details are in Materials and Methods. Data and code are available
on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at https://osf.io/py9u4/.
Study 1: Major Media Outlets. In Study 1, we looked at liberal (e.g.,
New York Times, MSNBC) and conservative (e.g., Fox News,
Breitbart) media accounts from Facebook (n = 599,999 posts)
and Twitter (n = 227,229 posts). First, we looked at the effect of
emotional language on message diffusion. Controlling for all
other factors, each additional negative affect word was associ-
ated with a 5 to 8% increase in shares and retweets, except in the
conservative media Facebook dataset, where it decreased shares
by around 2% (exp(b) = 0.98, 95% CI = [0.98, 0.99], P < 0.001).
Positive affect language was consistently associated with a de-
crease in shares and retweet rates by about 2 to 11% across
datasets. This largely replicates prior work on the negativity bias
in news headlines (24, 52). Additionally, moral-emotional words
consistently increased shares and retweets in all datasets by 10 to
17%, replicating prior work on the moral contagion effect with
similar effect sizes and extending on this work by showing that
moral contagion operates on multiple social media platforms,
including Facebook (21).
To test our primary questions, we looked at how political in-
group language predicted diffusion. In the liberal news media
accounts on Twitter, political in-group words were associated
with increased retweet rate (exp(b) = 1.10, 95% CI = [1.09,
1.12]). On Facebook, however, there was no equivalent effect of
political in-group language (exp(b) = 1.00, 95% CI = [0.99,
1.00]). In the conservative media Twitter accounts, political in-
group (conservative) words increased retweet rate (exp(b) =
1.23, 95% CI = [1.20, 1.26], P < 0.001), and this effect was similar
on Facebook (exp(b) = 1.37, 95% CI = [1.35, 1.38]), P < 0.001).
In sum, political in-group words led to an estimated 0 to 37%
increase in diffusion per word across all four media datasets.
We then looked at the effects of political out-group language.
In the liberal media Twitter accounts, out-group language was a
strong predictor of retweets (exp(b) = 1.46, 95% CI = [1.44,
1.48]). This effect was similar on Facebook, with out-group
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language leading to increased shares (exp(b) = 1.57, 95% CI =
[1.55, 1.58]). In the conservative media Twitter accounts, out-
group language increased retweet rate (exp(b) = 1.29, 95% CI
= [1.26, 1.31], P < 0.001), and this effect was similar on Facebook
(exp(b) = 1.35, 95% CI = [1.34, 1.36], P < 0.001). Thus, across
datasets, out-group language led to a 35 to 57% increase in
diffusion per additional out-group word.
Descriptively, the effect sizes of political out-group language
are generally larger than those of in-group language and con-
siderably larger than those of any of the emotional dictionaries.
The full regression models are reported in SI Appendix, Table S1
and are plotted visually in Fig. 1. The results were similar when
the control variables were removed (SI Appendix, Table S3) and
when the models were rerun with cluster-robust SEs with each
media account representing a different cluster (SI Appendix,
Table S4). To further probe the importance of each predictor in
the model, we calculated a relative importance analysis (SI Ap-
pendix, Table S4). In each of the models, out-group words had
the highest “lmg” values (an estimate of the R2 contributed by
each predictor) of all five of the key predictors. Thus, political
out-group language appears to be the most powerful predictor of
engagement of all factors measured.
We next assessed the valence generated by posts with political
out-group language. We expected posts about the out-group to
evoke negative emotions such as anger or outrage and posts about
the in-group to evoke positive emotions. Examples of some of the
most popular tweets and Facebook posts containing out-group
terms are in Table 1. Descriptively, these posts appeared to be
very negative. To assess the valence of these posts more system-
atically, we examined how out-group language predicted each of
the six “reactions” (like, love, haha, sad, wow, and angry) available
on Facebook. We assumed that the “angry” reaction was a rea-
sonable proxy for feelings of out-group animosity, outrage, and
anger, and the “love” reaction was a reasonable proxy for feelings
of in-group love. These results are plotted in Fig. 2, and full re-
gression models are shown in SI Appendix, Tables S6 and S7.
As expected, political out-group language was a very strong
predictor of “angry” reactions for both liberals (exp(b) = 3.33,
95% CI = [3.30, 3.37], P < 0.001) and for conservatives (exp(b) =
1.83, 95% CI = [1.81, 1.85], P < 0.001). Out-group words were
also strong predictors of “haha” reactions for both groups
(exp(b)liberals = 2.92, 95% CI = [2.90, 2.95], P < 0.001;
exp(b)conservatives = 2.47, 95% CI = [2.45, 2.50], P < 0.001). Thus,
posts about the out-group may generate engagement by inspiring
negative emotions such as anger, outrage, or mockery. Strikingly,
descriptive statistics (SI Appendix, Table S9) show that, on av-
erage, the angry reaction was the most popular of the six reac-
tions for both liberals and conservatives in the news media
accounts, consistent with the perspective that outrage is popular
on online social networks (18). On the flip side, in-group words,
as expected, strongly predicted love reactions for both liberals
(exp(b) = 1.66, 95% CI = [1.64, 1.68], P < 0.001) and conser-
vatives (exp(b) = 2.26, 95% CI = [2.24, 2.26], P < 0.001).
Study 2: Congress Members. In Study 2, we replicated the above
results in a different context: tweets (n = 1,078,562) and Face-
book posts (n = 825,424) by Democratic and Republican Con-
gressional members. Given growing levels of polarization in
Congress (53), and because political elites are often agenda
setters who frame political debates and influence public opinion
(54, 55), we thought this was an important additional context to
investigate the virality of social media posts.
Fig. 1. Political out-group words were the strongest predictors of shares and retweets from both liberal and conservative news media accounts (A and B,
respectively) and liberal and conservative congress member accounts (C and D, respectively) on Facebook and Twitter. By comparison, political in-group
words, as well as measures of discrete emotions, such as positive emotion words, negative emotion words, and moral-emotional words, were relatively weak
predictors of shares and retweets. Error bars represent 95% CI (though error bars are small).
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First, we looked at the effect of emotional language on virality.
Negative affect language consistently increased retweet rate and
shares across all datasets by 12 to 45% per negative affect word,
with the effect size being largest in the conservative Twitter
dataset (exp(b) = 1.45, 95% CI = [1.44, 1.45], P < 0.001). Sim-
ilarly, moral-emotional language had a consistent positive effect
across all datasets, increasing retweets and shares by roughly 5 to
10%. Positive affect language slightly decreased shares by roughly
2 to 5%, except in the conservative Twitter accounts (exp(b) =
1.04, 95% CI = [1.04, 1.05], P < 0.001). Replicating the results
from Study 1, negative language and moral-emotional language
were once again positively associated with diffusion, whereas
positive affect language was negatively associated with it.
Next, we again looked at the effects of political in-group lan-
guage. In the liberal congressional accounts, political in-group
language decreased retweet rate on Twitter (exp(b) = 0.75, 95%
CI = [0.75, 0.75], P < 0.001) and only slightly increased shares on
Facebook (exp(b) = 1.02, 95% CI = [1.01, 1.03], P < 0.001).
Similarly, in the conservative dataset, political in-group language
decreased retweet rate on Twitter (exp(b) = 0.85, 95% = [0.84,
0.85], P < 0.001) and slightly increased shares on Facebook
(exp(b) = 1.20, 95% = [1.19, 1.20], P < 0.001). In sum, political
in-group language led to a mixed pattern of results across all four
congressional datasets.
Replicating our findings with media accounts, political out-
group language was a very large predictor of retweets in the
liberal congressional Twitter accounts (exp(b) = 2.13), 95% CI =
[2.11, 2.15], P < 0.001) and of shares in the liberal congressional
Facebook accounts (exp(b) = 1.58, 95% CI = [1.57, 1.59], P <
0.001). The same was true in the conservative congressional
Twitter accounts (exp(b) = 2.80, 95% CI = [2.77, 2.84], P < 0.001)
and Facebook accounts (exp(b) = 1.65, 95% CI = [1.64, 1.67], P <
0.001). This effect translates into an estimated 65 to 180% in-
crease in the odds of being shared per out-group word across
datasets. Descriptively, these effect sizes are very large and larger
than those found in the news media accounts. This might be due
to the fact that members of Congress are explicitly identified with
a political party and have a large partisan following.
To further explore the importance of political out-group lan-
guage, we conducted another relative importance analysis (SI
Appendix, Table S13). In each model, out-group language had
the highest estimated R2 (“lmg”) value compared to the other
key predictors (political in-group, negative, positive, and moral-
emotional language). In other words, it was once again the most
important predictor in each model.
When examining different types of engagement (e.g., the six
Facebook reactions, reference SI Appendix, Tables S17 and S18
for more detail), we once again saw similar patterns to media
outlets. Posts about the out-group strongly predicted negative
reactions, such as “angry” reactions, for both liberals (exp(b) =
2.24, 95% CI = [2.22, 2.25], P < 0.001) and for conservatives
(exp(b) = 1.68, 95% CI = [1.67, 1.69], P < 0.001). On the other
hand, posts about the political in-group predicted “love” reac-
tions for both liberals (exp(b) = 1.23, 95% CI = [1.22, 1.24], P <
0.001) and for conservatives (exp(b) = 1.32, 95% CI = [1.31,
1.33], P < 0.001). Descriptive statistics (SI Appendix, Tables S19
and S20) again found that the angry reaction was generally the
most popular reaction, although the “love” reaction slightly sur-
passed the angry reaction in popularity in the conservative dataset.
Internal Meta-Analysis. To estimate the average effect sizes across
all eight datasets, we conducted a series of internal meta-analyses
(Fig. 3A and SI Appendix, Table S22). We computed a random-
effects meta-analysis (because we expected this effect to vary
across contexts) and used the Dersimonian–Laird estimator.
Across datasets, each political out-group word increased the odds
of a retweet or share by about 67% (estimated exp(b) = 1.67, 95%
CI = [1.43, 1.69], P < 0.001).* Political in-group language, on the
other hand, did not have a statistically significant effect on shares
and retweets (exp(b) = 1.05, 95% CI = [0.90, 1.22], P = 0.563).
Negative affect language increased diffusion by about 14% per
word (exp(b) = 1.14, 95% CI = [1.05, 1.24]), moral-emotional
language increased diffusion by 10% per word (exp(b) = 1.10,
95% CI = [1.07, 1.13], P < 0.001), and positive affect language
decreased diffusion by about 5% per word (exp(b) = 0.95, 95%
CI = [0.93, 0.98], P < 0.001).
To put these effect sizes in context, the average percent increase
in shares of political out-group language was about 4.8 times as
large as that of negative affect language and about 6.7 times as
large as that of moral-emotional language. While one might ex-
pect words that have clear political content (e.g., names of specific
politicians) to be more predictive of social media shares than
words that refer to general emotions (e.g., adjectives such as
“bad”), this large effect size is notable, because negative emotion
and moral-emotional language are well-established predictors of








BREAKING: PRESIDENT TRUMP HAS BEEN
IMPEACHED.
82,886 Reported Antifa Protester tries a sucker punch and




Vice PresidentMike Pence blatantly lied to reporters
about the trajectory of COVID-19 cases in
Oklahoma, where President Trump is scheduled to
hold a large campaign rally on Saturday.





Donald Trump has lied more than 3,000 times since
taking office but Republicans refuse to say Trump is
a liar. What’s going on?
29,737 Democrats just passed a bill that would make it
harder for American innovators to develop a




Republicans are saying they are being barred from
the “secret” hearings. But here’s a list of every
Republican who is allowed into the hearings.
41,541 RT to tell Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi to STOP
blocking critical funding for small businesses. The
Paycheck Protection Program is about to run out of
money—millions of jobs are hanging in the balance.
Congress MUST ACT!
37,872
Examples of some of the most popular posts from each dataset, along with their shares and retweets at the time of data collection. Political out-group
language is bolded.
*Using different estimators for the meta-analysis did not yield different results. For in-
stance, using the Empirical Bayes estimator led to the following estimated effect size:
exp(b) = 1.67, 95% CI = [1.40, 2.00], P < 0.001, which is the same effect size with a slightly
larger CI.
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diffusion on social networks (19, 21, 22, 52) and have been the
main focus of prior work looking at social media diffusion. Here,
we show that the use of out-group terms (but not in-group terms)
is a much stronger predictor of diffusion than various measure-
ments of moral or emotional language.
We then analyzed a set of moderator variables in the meta-
analysis. The effect of political out-group language on diffusion
was not moderated by political orientation (exp(b) = 0.98, 95%
CI = [0.75, 1.30], P = 0.187) nor by social media platform
(exp(b) = 1.20, 95% CI = [0.91, 1.58], P = 0.910). However, it
was moderated by whether the tweets came from members of
Congress as opposed to news media accounts (exp(b) = 1.39,
95% CI = [0.91, 1.58], P < 0.018).† Thus, we did not detect any
ideological asymmetries in the internal meta-analysis nor did we
find any key differences between social media platforms. How-
ever, the effect was clearly stronger among politicians than in the
news media accounts, possibly because of the more explicitly
partisan rhetoric of political leaders. The estimated effect size
for the media datasets only was exp(b) = 1.41, 95% CI = [1.30,
1.54], P < 0.001 (a 41% increase) and the estimated effect size
for the Congress datasets was exp(b) = 1.99, 95% CI = [1.53,
2.58], P < 0.001 (a 99% increase).
Because this analysis focused on the effect of each additional
out-group word, we also conducted additional analyses where we
examined how much a post with at least one out-group term
diffused compared to a post with at least one in-group term,
controlling for all the same relevant variables. Posts with both in-
group and out-group terms, as well as posts with no in-group and
out-group terms, were excluded from this analysis. Thus, we
could directly compare how much posts about only the out-group
(coded as 1) diffused compared to posts about only the in-group
(coded as 0), following the methods of past research that have
looked at how the diffusion of false news compares to true news
(25). When meta-analyzed across all eight datasets, posts with at
least one out-group word were more than twice as likely to be
shared than posts with at least one in-group word (estimated
exp(b) = 2.32, 95% CI = [1.57, 2.47], P < 0.001) (a 132%
increase).
We also conducted internal meta-analyses using the same
methods to report average effect sizes for each of the Facebook
reactions (Fig. 3B). While all reactions are shown in Fig. 3, we
focused specifically on “anger” and “love” reactions, as these
most clearly indicate out-group animosity or in-group love. Out-
group language was a very large predictor of the “angry” reaction
across datasets (exp(b) = 2.19, 95% CI = [1.68, 2.84], P < 0.001),
Fig. 2. In-group and out-group words predicted different types of engagement in both the liberal and conservative news media accounts (A and B, re-
spectively) and congress accounts (C and D, respectively). Political out-group words were strong predictors of shares, comments, “haha,” and “angry” re-
actions, whereas in-group words were strong predictors of “love” reactions. Reactions are shown as they are shown on the Facebook and Twitter platforms
(from Top to Bottom: share, comment, like, heart, haha, wow, sad, angry, retweet, and favorite). Error bars represent 95% CI (though error bars are small).
†For the moderation analysis, liberal was coded as 1, conservative was coded as 0, Twitter
was coded as 1, Facebook was coded as 0, Congress was coded as 1, and media was coded
as 0.
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but in-group language was only marginally associated with the
“angry” reaction (exp(b) = 1.18, 95% CI = [0.99, 0.42], P = 0.07).
Furthermore, in-group language was strongly associated with the
“love” reaction across datasets (exp(b) = 1.57, 95% CI = [1.24,
2.00], P < 0.001), whereas out-group language was not associated
with the “love” reaction (exp(b) = 1.15, 95% CI = [1.00, 1.33],
P = 0.059). Thus, out-group language appears to reflect out-
group derogation, whereas in-group language reflects in-group
favoritism. Furthermore, the effect size of out-group language
predicting “angry” reactions was more than twice as big as the
effect size of in-group language predicting “love” reactions, once
again showing an out-group bias.
We wanted to test whether the effect of political out-group
language was not driven by any specific words in particular (e.g.,
“Trump”). To examine this, we repeated our analysis with each
of the three subdictionaries that made up the political out-group
language dictionary: 1) the dictionaries of the Democratic and
Republican “identity” terms (i.e., “Democrat,” “right-wing,” or
“leftist”), 2) lists of the top 100 Democratic and Republican
politicians as ranked by YouGov, along with their Twitter han-
dles (or Facebook page names on Facebook), and 3) lists of all
liberal and conservative congressional members, along with their
Twitter handles (or Facebook page name on Facebook). We
then meta-analyzed these results across all eight datasets.
Looking only at the “identity” terms, political out-group lan-
guage led to an estimated 91% increase in the odds of being
shared per word (exp(b) = 1.91, 95% CI = [1.38, 2.64], P < 0.001).
An additional word from the top 100 most famous politicians
dictionary led to an estimated 82% increase in the odds of being
shared (exp(b) = 1.82, 95% CI = [1.53, 2.17], P < 0.001). Lastly,
each additional word from the list of out-group congressional
members led to a 43% increase in shares (exp(b) = 1.43, 95% CI =
[1.23, 1.66], P < 0.001). In other words, whether referring to a
general identity term, a famous politician, or a member of Con-
gress, out-group language is a very strong predictor of diffusion.
This helps validate that this phenomenon is not dependent on any
one specific dictionary and is robust across specifications. The
slightly smaller effect size of out-group congressional words may
be due to the fact that many congressional members are not as
widely known as the most famous politicians. Because of this,
including the full list of congressional members in the main
analysis may have led to a conservative estimation of the true
effect size.
Discussion
Across 2,730,215 total observations from Facebook and Twitter,
we find that posts about the political out-group are consistently
more likely to be shared than those about the political in-group.
The effect of out-group language was the most important pre-
dictor of sharing behavior in posts from both news media ac-
counts and politicians—considerably stronger than the effects of
political in-group language or various discrete emotions, which
have previously been the main focus when assessing what makes
content go “viral” online (17, 26, 56). To contextualize this large
effect, the percent increase in estimated shares associated with
out-group language was 4.8 times as big as that of negative affect
language and 6.7 times as big as that of moral-emotional
language—previously established predictors of message diffusion
online.
This out-group effect was also robust against different ways of
operationalizing the out-group, suggesting that this pattern of
results is not primarily driven by the mention of specific terms or
particularly divisive politicians, such as Donald Trump. The ef-
fect was not moderated by political orientation or by social
media platform when we measured findings in an internal meta-
analysis. However, the effect of out-group language was con-
siderably stronger among politicians than in the news media
accounts, perhaps because of the more explicitly partisan rhe-
toric among political elites (57, 58) and their followers. Addi-
tionally, given prior concerns that much of social media research
focuses predominantly on Twitter due to the relatively easy ac-
cessibility of Twitter data (4), it is notable that similar patterns
were found on both Twitter and Facebook.
Political in-group and out-group language also generated
distinctly different forms of engagement, reflecting clear patterns
of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. For instance,
out-group language strongly predicted “angry” reactions (as well
as “haha” reactions, comments, and shares), and in-group lan-
guage strongly predicted love reactions. Though, notably, out-
group language was about twice as strong a predictor of “angry”
reactions as in-group words were of “love” reactions. Thus, posts
about the out-group may be so successful because they appeal to
emotions such as anger, outrage, and mockery. Indeed, the “an-
gry” reaction was the most popular reaction on Facebook in seven
of the eight datasets analyzed.
This research is consistent with prior research showing that
expressions of moral outrage (which involve emotions such as
anger or disgust) are particularly likely to go viral (18, 26), but it
expands on that work by illuminating the role of out-group an-
imosity in eliciting outrage. The current research reveals the key
role that out-group identity language played in predicting sharing
behavior above and beyond emotional words alone. In fact, in SI
Appendix, Tables S6, S7, S17, and S18, we found that emotional
language was weakly associated with the various Facebook re-
actions, suggesting that out-of-context emotional language used
Fig. 3. In A, the meta-analyzed effect sizes across all eight datasets are shown. The effect size of political out-group language was 4.7 times as large as that
of negative affect language and 6.7 times as large as moral-emotional language. In B, the meta-analyzed effect sizes of in-group and out-group language on
each of the Facebook reactions are shown. In-group language predicted “love” reactions, whereas out-group language strongly predicted “angry” reactions.
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in a post may not be the most precise way to measure actual
emotions evoked by a social media post.
These results demonstrate how the predictions of social identity
theory play out in a modern social media context (see ref. 24). As
expected, posts that appeal to identity-based motives tend to re-
ceive more engagement in online social networks. Additionally,
there is also a strong asymmetry such that out-group negativity is
stronger than in-group positivity, reflecting the current state of
negative partisanship in the United States (45, 46). These results
also expand on prior work on the motives behind social media
sharing. Social media sharing often reflects a desire to maintain a
positive self-presentation (17, 29). This can lead to different out-
comes depending on the context, social norms, and design features
of one’s online network (59), since strategies to maintain a positive
self-image may differ by context (26, 60). While many studies find
a negativity bias in online sharing (19, 52), there are some contexts
where positive content is shared more often. For instance, the
New York Times most emailed list tends to have more positive
content (29, 56), as do viral articles about science (56). However,
in online contexts where political identity is highly salient, and
where political conflict is driven by negative partisanship, the best
way to maintain an image of a good in-group member and to
distinguish oneself from the out-group may be to share expressions
of out-party animosity (47). Additionally, other work has found
that words that predict virality (such as moral or emotional words)
are prioritized in early visual attention (61). Political identity-
relevant content may also be similarly attention grabbing, espe-
cially when political conflicts have become excessively negative
and moralized (46).
While much of the literature on social media and political
polarization has focused on the formation of echo chambers, the
finding that social media amplifies out-group animosity might be
more concerning than the formation of echo chambers alone.
Even if people are exposed to more cross-partisan content than
expected (6, 12), our findings suggest that opposing views on
social media may be excessively negative about one’s own side.
This may help explain why exposure to opposing views on
Twitter can actually increase political polarization (62). Thus,
the severity of online echo chambers appears to be a less im-
portant issue than the kind of content that tends to surface at the
top of one’s feed, since exposure to divisive in-party or out-party
voices is unlikely to be productive. While future experimental
work is needed to examine the consequences of these trends, the
amplification of divisive posts on social media—from both in-
party and out-party sources—may be playing a role in rising
political polarization.
This big data approach comes with many benefits, such as
allowing us to understand how political identity contributes to
engagement with online content and thus has high ecological
validity. However, this approach also comes with several limita-
tions. While these results may be consistent with theoretical pre-
dictions, they are correlational, and further experimental work
should be conducted to determine causation and help clarify why
content about out-group identities is engaging in online political
conversations. Additionally, while we found this effect among
contexts on two of the largest social media platforms, we were
unable to follow up certain important questions, such as who is
producing this engagement, due to data access limitations.
It is important to note that the data we observed are likely
reflective of a specific time frame, namely the years leading up to
the 2020 election. Since the language of political elites can change
depending on which party is in power (63), and the United States
is at historically high levels of polarization (44), it is unclear
whether these results would generalize to different time periods or
nations. It is also unclear how algorithmic choices on the part of
Facebook or Twitter might contribute to the amplification of out-
group animosity, since social media companies are not transparent
about how their algorithms work. Despite these drawbacks, this
study reveals a consequential trend playing out within two of the
most influential social networks, inspiring many questions for
future research.
This research is also important on a practical level. Social
media is encroaching on more aspects of our lives, becoming one
of the main ways in which people consume news and interact
with politicians (64). Since the social media ecosystem operates
as an attention economy (65) whereby users, politicians, and brands
fight for attention and engagement, understanding what drives
virality is crucial. Virality can contribute to the success of a social
movement, business, or political campaign (20), so people have
strong incentives to generate viral, engaging content. Virality is also
essential for social media companies, as the business model of so-
cial media is grounded in generating engagement with the platform,
which leads to advertising revenue. When the chief goal is virality,
this may create negative externalities in the form of polarizing,
hyperpartisan, or false content. Indeed, false political news tends to
be highly negative about the outgroup (39), so our findings may be
relevant to the viral spread of misinformation online. Content
expressing out-group animosity may be good at generating super-
ficial engagement while ultimately harming individuals, political
parties, or society in the long-term.
The design structure of social media platforms may be creating
perverse incentives for polarizing content when users do not truly
want this. For instance, people report that they do not want
political leaders to express partisan animus (66), but our results
suggest this content receives the most engagement. As further
illustration of these perverse incentives, the New York Times
reported on internal research from Facebook finding that posts
that users rated as “bad for the world” received more engage-
ment. When Facebook tested a feature to down-rank posts that
were rated as “bad for the world,” engagement decreased, and
Facebook ultimately chose not to approve the feature (67). Thus,
social media companies may be reluctant to implement features
that could reduce polarization due to their strong financial in-
centives to maintain user engagement.
Conclusion
Understanding the factors that make social media posts go “vi-
ral” online can help to create better social media environments.
While social media platforms are not fully transparent about how
their algorithmic ranking system works, Facebook announced in
a post titled “Bringing People Closer Together” that it was
changing its algorithm ranking system to value “deeper” forms of
engagement, such as reactions and comments (68). Ironically,
posts about the political out-group were particularly effective at
generating comments and reactions (particularly the “angry” re-
action, the most popular reaction across our studies). In other
words, these algorithmic changes made under the guise of bringing
people closer together may have helped prioritize posts including
out-group animosity. In addition to informing algorithmic changes
(69), this research might inform other design changes (70), or
policy changes that can be implemented to improve social media
conversations, as well as future research on the role of social
identity in online engagement. Amid widespread discussion that
social media may be contributing to discord and polarization, our
work reveals how out-group animosity predicts virality in two of
the largest social networks.
Materials and Methods
All methods were approved by the University of Cambridge Research Ethics
Committee. For Study 1, we collected tweets from several news media ac-
counts across the political spectrum using the R package “rtweet” and the
Twitter API (application programming interface). After collecting up to
3,200 of the most recent tweets from each account (the total amount per-
mitted by the Twitter API), we were left with a total of 227,229 total tweets
for analysis. These news media accounts were chosen because they were
classified by the All Sides Media Bias Chart (SI Appendix, Fig. S3), which aims
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to identify the political bias of various news sources. This allowed us to split
the dataset into tweets from liberal (n = 143,702) and conservative (n =
83,527) media sources. In Study 2, we analyzed tweets from all members of
Congress (up to 3,200 tweets per member). We split the dataset into tweets
from Democratic (n = 747,675) and Republican (n = 611,292) US congressional
members.
Facebook data were retrieved through a partnership with Crowdtangle, a
tool owned by Facebook that aggregates data from public pages, and Social
Science One, an organization that forms partnerships with industry and social
science researchers. Using the Crowdtangle platform, we created lists of the
same liberal and conservative media accounts from https://www.allsides.com/
media-bias/media-bias-ratings and downloaded the 300,000 most recent
posts from these lists of media accounts. We also used official lists assembled
by the Crowdtangle staff of the current Democrat and Republican US House
of Representative and Senate Members. After combining the downloaded
lists of the US House of Representatives and US Senate, we were left with
366,842 liberal Congress Facebook posts and 458,582 conservative Congress
Facebook posts. All data were retrieved during 2020, and the majority of the
observations for the media accounts range from 2018 to 2020 and range
from 2016 to 2020 in the congressional accounts. More information about
the exact timeline that the tweets and Facebook posts reflect is in SI Ap-
pendix, Fig. S2. Data and code are available on the OSF at https://osf.io/
py9u4/, though text of individual social media posts could not be shared for
privacy reasons. We determined our sample size and exclusions in advance
of analyzing the data and, where possible, kept the analysis methods as
close as possible for Twitter and Facebook.
We used the R package “quanteda” to analyze Twitter and Facebook text.
During text preprocessing, we removed punctuation, URLs, and numbers. To
classify whether a specific post was referring to a liberal or a conservative, we
adapted previously used dictionaries that referred to words associated with
liberals or conservatives (39). Specifically, these dictionaries included 1) a list of
the top 100 most famous Democratic and Republican politicians according to
YouGov, along with their Twitter handles (or Facebook page names for the
Facebook datasets) (e.g., “Trump,” “Pete Buttigieg,” “@realDonaldTrump”);
2) a list of the current Democratic and Republican (but not independent) US
Congressional members (532 total) along with their Twitter and Facebook
names (e.g., “Amy Klobuchar,” “Tom Cotton”); and 3) a list of about 10 terms
associated with Democratic (e.g., “liberal,” “democrat,” or “leftist”) or Re-
publican identity (e.g., “conservative,” “republican,” or “ring-wing”). We then
assigned each tweet a count for words that matched our Republican and
Democrat dictionaries (for instance, if a tweet mentioned two words in the
“Republican” dictionary, it would receive a score of “2” in that category). We
also used previously validated dictionaries that counted the number of positive
and negative affect words per post (51) and the number of moral-emotional
words per post (22). All dictionaries are available on the OSF (https://osf.io/
py9u4/), except for the positive and negative affect dictionaries, which are
proprietary and must be purchased through the program LIWC (Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count) (51).
In each dataset, adapting prior methods (22), we fit ordinary least squares
regression models to examine how language about the out-group, language
about the in-group, as well as language expressing various emotions (posi-
tive affect, negative affect, and moral-emotional language) predicted retweet
rates. We controlled for whether a post contained a URL, media (i.e., photo or
video), the number of followers each account had, and whether a tweet was a
retweet. All variables were mean-centered using the R package “jtools.” Fol-
lowing prior work (22), we log-transformed the retweet-count and share
outcome variables to account for the fact that these variables are typically
skewed. We applied the same models to each of the individual Facebook re-
actions to assess different forms of engagement. Afterward, we conducted
several random-effects internal meta-analyses using the R package “meta.”
Analyses were performed using R version 4.0.1.
Data Availability. Anonymized partial social media data and analysis code are
available on OSF (https://osf.io/py9u4/). Some data could not be included
(e.g., the raw social media text and usernames) due to privacy concerns.
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